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The violent breakup of the former Yugoslavia, with its most brutal manifestation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) from 1992 to 1995, has been the subject of sustained scholarly 
interest for the past two decades. One of the main points of contention and fierce debate 
has been the issue of genocide: if it has been committed, where, when and by whom. These 
disagreements are largely the result of scholars applying different understandings of the concept 
of genocide, where one group of scholars uses the definition from the 1948 United Nations 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, while others consider 
that definition, which was subsequently adopted by international criminal tribunals, to be too 
limited. In this personal account, Edina Bećirević argues that Srebrenica was not the only instance 
of genocide in BiH but a “culmination of a planned and widespread genocidal process begun in 
the spring of 1992 and meant to exterminate Bosnian Muslims throughout the territory of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina” (p. xii). 
The work focuses on seven municipalities of eastern Bosnia, exploring the patterns of mass 
violence in Zvornik, Vlasenica, Bratunac, Rogatica, Foča, Višegrad, and Srebrenica. Given that the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague has prosecuted 
dozens of individuals for crimes in BiH since the end of the war, the evidence, testimonies, and 
judgments have significantly influenced academia, not least because of the incredible amount 
of documents that are available to researchers in ICTY archives. The author of this book relied 
extensively on those archives in her research. Another significant case that influenced how the war 
in BiH is understood by scholars is the ruling of the International Court of Justice, also in The Hague, 
in 2007. Both courts, one determining individual responsibility and the other those of states, came 
to the conclusion that the one incident, i.e. set of events, that qualifies as genocide in the case of BiH 
is Srebrenica, in July of 1995, where Bosnian Serb forces over-ran a protected enclave populated 
mostly by Bosnian Muslims, resulting in mass executions of around eight thousand men and boys. 
The detained men were locked up in schools and warehouses, sometimes beaten, then killed in 
summary executions, their bodies scattered in mass graves only to be dug up again in secret, some 
months later, in an attempt to hide the evidence. The independent scholarly community has, by 
and large, accepted the rulings and consider Srebrenica to be the ‘only’ genocide not only in BiH, 
but in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.  
In five chapters, Bećirević analyzes the campaign of the violent expulsion of non-Serbs, starting 
in the spring of 1992, detailing the role of local authorities in putting the campaign in motion. 
Her analysis provides us with a better understanding of how mass expulsions, dispossession, and 
detention of thousands and their exposure to torture and inhumane conditions were orchestrated. 
Significant attention is given to the post-war period, where Bećirević places much attention on 
the denial of mass atrocities, murder and rape committed by Serb forces during the conflict. The 
author is a Bosnian native and her book shows an intimate understanding of the communities, 
which coupled with extensive research of evidence material presented at the ICTY, makes it a 
valuable contribution to the debate. However, the tone often drifts from scholarly to journalistic 
and the evidence and analysis do not always sufficiently support her bold claim of genocide in the 
entire territory of BiH, throughout the war. At times, it seems that the author is more interested in 
advocacy than a detached scholarly analysis.    
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The violent campaign aiming to remove non-Serbs from the territories claimed by the 
Serb leadership in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 1990s is largely accepted 
in scholarship and was described in many works, from James Gow’s analysis during the early 
days of the war, to the recent contributions by Robert Donia. The aim of the campaign was the 
creation of a homogeneous, contiguous territory populated by Serbs. Those contributions stop 
short of calling what the Bosnian Serb leadership did, with support from the Belgrade regime and 
Slobodan Milošević, genocide. Mark Mazower states that the goal of the campaign was not the total 
extermination of Bosnian Muslims but their removal from the territory and that “ethnic cleansing 
was an integral part of nation-building, or to be more precise nation-enlarging” for the Bosnian 
Serb and Serbian authorities.1 That view is shared by Dulić and Hall who make a convincing case 
when stating that Bosnian Serbs made excessive territorial demands, but “did not seek to control 
the entire country.” The Bosnian Serb forces “refrained from capturing municipalities where 
Serbs constituted a small minority of the population, unless these were of extremely high strategic 
importance.”2 They continue by saying that “massacre and expulsion were means by which they 
‘cleansed’ territories and thus obtained demographic control over contested space.”3 War crimes 
were an essential part of the Serbian strategy in the war, claimed Gow.4 
Bećirević’s contribution seems to suffer from what Christian Axboe Nielsen calls “genocide 
myopia” in relation to BiH, where any conclusion that a set of crimes committed against non-Serbs 
was not genocide, be it by a judicial or scholarly authority, is considered flawed.5 For Bećirević, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes are not enough, as if those qualifications are somehow 
less serious, or less deserving of condemnation. Genocide is a concept that was born out of the 
advocacy of Raphael Lemkin, and the definition in the 1948 Genocide Convention is a result of 
negotiations. Much criticism has been leveled at it for not including political groups among those 
that are considered protected. That definition is limited, and proving that charge in a courtroom 
has been challenging for prosecutors. Claiming that everyone who subscribes to this definition 
and thus finds it impossible to accept her argument that genocide has been committed on the 
entire territory of BiH, from 1992 to 1995, and calling them deniers, as Bećirević does, is wrong 
and fundamentally unfair. Many of those that accept ICTY and ICJ judgments in calling Srebrenica 
genocide, but refrain from doing so for other municipalities, have no history of political bias and 
have spoken out about the violent take-over of municipalities, the mass detentions, the killings and 
rape committed against non-Serbs.   
The approach taken by the author could be more nuanced when she analyzes the relevant 
actors i.e. those that put the mass violence in motion. Too often, she speaks of ‘Serbs’ as actors, a 
homogeneous agent with a homogeneous leadership led by the puppet master Milošević and his 
allies in BiH. This approach is reductionist and is belied by extensive documentation and evidence 
presented at the ICTY. Catherine Baker makes a good point when she asks authors to be specific 
and attribute actions to individuals and institutions instead of groups, “even though it lengthens 
sentences.”6
Ideology, or nationalism, is emphasized as the main driving force of the violence, and the 
book makes ample use of historical events which have allegedly primed the Serb communities to 
separate themselves from others, in this case Bosnian Muslims, and commit genocide. However, 
it is not clearly explained how those processes allegedly took place. Historical events become 
myths that are then used to mobilize nationalist sentiment, but as Siniša Malešević rightly argues, 
1 Mark Mazower, “Review Essay Violence and the State in the Twentieth Century,” The American Historical Review 107 (4) 
(2002), 1163. 
2 Tomislav Dulić and Jonathan Hall, “The logic(s) of ethnic violence: Control, ideology and the spatial distribution of 
indiscriminate violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1941-45/1992-95” (Unpublished manuscript, Uppsala University, 
2014), 5.  
3 Ibid., 5. 
4 James Gow, The Serbian Project and its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes (London: C. Hurts & Co., 2003), 2.  
5 Christian Axboe Nielsen, “Surmounting the myopic focus on genocide: the case of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 
Journal of Genocide Research, 15:1 (2013), 22. 
6 Catherine Baker, The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 3. 
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nationalism is not inherently violent and more attention should have been given to analyzing how 
and why that particular nationalism turned violent.7 It would have also been interesting to discuss 
the similarities and differences between state-level elite and local leaderships and their motivations. 
Dulić and Kostić have argued that ideology has dominated the motivations of the elites, while fear 
and insecurity played a more significant role at the local level.8 
In sum, this book is thought-provoking and valuable in the micro analysis of the dynamics 
of violence and the role of local Bosnian Serb authorities in orchestrating the violence that swept 
the country in the spring of 1992. However, it has made the mistake of arguing more than it can 
actually prove. A dreadful machinery of violence that left one hundred thousand dead and over a 
million displaced was set in motion in early 1992 by Bosnian Serb authorities: it included camps, 
expulsion, dispossession, mass murder, torture and rape. Not labeling all of those events as 
genocide does not minimize the experiences of those who suffered through them, or perished. The 
narrower understanding of genocide, as defined by the UN Convention, and its application to BiH 
simply aims to differentiate between types of mass violence. The mass executions after the fall of 
Srebrenica, in 1995, were indeed unique in their systematic nature and the consequences they had 
on those communities. Srebrenica can be understood as a culmination of the policies set in place 
three years earlier, but it should be categorized as distinct—as genocide. 
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